

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy on Control of Armaments

REFERENCES: A. NSC Action No. 1419  
B. NSC Action No. 1513 and Annex thereto  
C. NSC Action No. 1553 and Annex thereto  
D. NSC 5707/8  
E. NSC Actions Nos. 1676 and 1722

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, is transmitted herewith for preliminary consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Monday, January 6, 1958.

Also enclosed for the information of the Council are Annexes A, B and C (consisting of maps referred to in the enclosed report); and Annex D, "Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament", made by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States in the Sub-Committee of the UN Disarmament Commission.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
The Special Assistant to the President  
for Disarmament  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

\*NSC Review Completed \*

State Department review completed

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## REVISION OF U. S. POLICY ON DISARMAMENT

### I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

#### Need for Review of U. S. Disarmament Position

1. Present basic policy states that the United States should "actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments". (NSC Action No. 1419, June 30, 1955; NSC 5707/8, June 3, 1957)
2. It is clear that the major developments since the last U. S. comprehensive review of detailed positions on disarmament require an essential revision of such detailed positions in order to form a reasonable foundation for actively seeking a sound and safeguarded agreement with the USSR on disarmament.
3. The U. S. net evaluation studies conducted by the General Thomas Committee; the Security Resources Panel Report (Gaither Group); and the U. S. joint intelligence estimates; all point to the high degree of devastation which would result from a modern general war and thus confirm the soundness of the basic U. S. policy to actively seek a sound safeguarded agreement.
4. One feature of the August 29th Western proposals\* widely criticized at the recent United Nations General Assembly sessions by Free World nations as well as by the Soviet Bloc countries, has been the "inseparability clause". This clause is contained in Section XI of the August 29th proposals. It states: "This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable."
5. The U. S. Ambassador in Moscow recently has reported: "I continue to believe that the Soviets genuinely seek a first step agreement on disarmament and believe it is this they have chiefly in mind in pressing for high-level talks" (November 23, 1957). However, he considers that the Soviets from their standpoint regard the August 29th proposals as so heavily weighted in the West's favor that the United States should not realistically expect the Soviet Union to accept them, nor should the United States consider the Soviet rejection of them to be a fair test of whether or not the Soviet is genuinely seeking an agreement. (Cable of Ambassador Thompson, September 3, 1957)
6. The most recent U. S. intelligence estimate on Soviet capabilities and policies (NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957) states that "The USSR clearly regards the present Western disarmament proposals as heavily loaded in favor of the West."
7. The only feasible way to ascertain whether or not the Soviet Union will enter into an inspected and safeguarded agreement which is reasonable and which would be mutually desirable because of a resultant reduction in the dangers of war, is to make an offer of such an agreement.

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\* See Annex D hereto.

8. Making such an offer is also the only reliable manner in which the cohesion and support of the peoples of the free nations and of the uncommitted states can be maintained by the United States. This cohesion and support of the peoples of the free nations is vital to the security of the United States.

#### Separate Test Suspension

9. The United States has consistently held to the position that inspection is necessary for each step in each provision of any disarmament agreement. Thus when the Soviet Union proposed the suspension of nuclear testing, the United States insisted upon the requirement of inspection. In the informal bilateral discussions, carried on with full knowledge of the other Western partners at London, the Soviet Union on June 7, 1957, agreed to inspection stations inside the USSR to monitor the suspension of nuclear testing.

10. The United States has also consistently maintained that a first step should be carefully measured and should guard against a disadvantageous result in the event of violation by the Soviet Union. Thus the United States insisted that a first agreement for test suspension should be of limited duration so that laboratories could be maintained in the event of a breach of the agreement. The Soviet Union finally responded in the informal bilateral discussions conducted in London with a counter-proposal of an initial period of two or three years of nuclear test suspension.

11. Leading U. S. atomic scientists state that they could hold their laboratories and scientists together for a two-year period if it was explained as being in the national interest, and they could during this period conduct highly desirable nuclear research without conducting test explosions.

12. The latest U. S. intelligence estimate on Soviet policies states that while the Soviet would prefer a disarmament agreement without significant inspection features, "they would be willing to accept limited inspection arrangements to detect violation of a nuclear test ban, and a minimal number of fixed observation posts in connection with any agreed arms reductions" (NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957).

13. At the UN General Assembly session on November 19, 1957, the key vote in the test suspension issue was taken on an Indian resolution which provided for an inspected suspension of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The vote was 24 in favor, 34 against, and 20 abstentions. The make-up of this 34 voting with the United States was 27 nations in the NATO and Latin America groups, plus Australia, Nationalist China, Pakistan, Spain, the Philippines, Israel, and New Zealand. New Zealand with its new Government has since changed its position and now favors a test suspension. Six Latin American countries did not follow the U. S. lead--but even more significant was the fact that 24 Asian-African countries did not support the United States. As indicated above, no African countries supported the United States on this vote, and only 4 Asian countries (Nationalist China, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Israel).

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14. It is widely recognized that Asia and Africa are principal competitive battlegrounds and may probably swing the decisive weight between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. The two leaders of two most influential Asian nations--India and Japan--have repeatedly and strongly spoken out in favor of a separate test suspension. Nehru, on December 10, 1957, said: "I feel that suspension of atomic explosives is a valid first step (in disarmament). It is a dramatic step. It would not change the power of any country but would give it a tremendous lead. It would come as a tremendous relief to hundreds of millions all over the world."

15. The prompt negotiation of an inspected two-year test suspension, because of the time necessary to work out the inspection agreement and obtain Senate approval, could not at best be made effective as a ratified treaty prior to September 1, 1958, and therefore the next series of U. S. tests would be completed before the suspension became effective. When this next series of tests is completed, a very comprehensive family of weapons in large supply will be available to the United States.

16. A temporary suspension of nuclear weapons tests would bring into being a United Nations supervisory organization which could be the forerunner of an organization to regulate and control armaments and armed forces in the decades ahead.

17. A temporary suspension of nuclear tests would establish a climate conducive to sound successful negotiations on successive steps of armaments regulation and control.

18. A temporary nuclear test suspension would: (a) inhibit the development of more powerful new types of weapons at a time when the United States would have a relative superiority in nuclear weapons; (b) deter the spread of the production of nuclear weapons to other less responsible countries; (c) break the 12-year stalemate in the disarmament negotiations and establish a climate conducive to sound successful negotiations on further steps of armaments regulation and control; (d) carry with it an inspection system which would begin the opening up of the Soviet Union and other Communist areas to international regular observation and would assist in the evolution of the Soviet system toward a more liberal and peaceful form.

#### Inspection Zones

19. Another consideration resulting from the recent London and New York disarmament discussions is that there is reason to believe that the Soviet might separate out from its proposals and negotiate a reasonable European inspection zone. The USSR would prefer to have a de-nuclearized zone in Central Europe (Bulganin letter of December 10, 1957) but would also consider a European inspection zone as a first step.

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20. The latest intelligence estimate on Soviet policies states that the Soviet leaders are "acutely concerned over the potential threat of a revived and nationalistic Germany backed by the United States." The USSR has tended to concentrate on such disarmament proposals as the ban on use of nuclear weapons, liquidation of foreign bases, and troop withdrawals in Europe. According to the intelligence estimate: "Their (Soviet) interest in inducing a U. S. troop withdrawal from Europe would probably lead them to go even further (than inspection for a test ban) in allowing mutual inspection in Europe." (NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957)

21. General Norstad has recommended to the NATO Council that it would "enhance the security" of NATO to establish a European inspection zone against surprise attack. Norstad said that the "minimum area" he had in mind was Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

22. The present Western position (August 29, 1957) states that provided there is agreement by the USSR to either a North America-Soviet Union zone or an Arctic Circle zone that the United States, with the concurrence of its allies, would agree to a European inspection zone including all of Europe to the Ural Mountains (60 degrees East longitude) and in the south to latitude 40 degrees North. If the Soviet reject this zone (which they have), the policy provides that under the same proviso as above a more limited zone of inspection in Europe would be "discussed", but only if a significant part of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe, was included.

23. The Soviet has rejected the August 29th European zone proposals. However, they did evince interest in earlier informal U. S. suggestions based on a 5° E-30° E zone running from a line east of Paris to a line just west of Leningrad-Odessa. In response to this informal U. S. probing, the Soviet on April 30, 1957, responded with a proposal for a zone running from 0 degree (Greenwich) to 25° E (Lvov-Brest-Wilna).

24. The Soviet likewise has rejected the August 29th Arctic Zone and the North American-USSR zone. In response to informal earlier probing by the United States during the London talks, the Soviet on April 30th responded with the suggestion of an Eastern Siberia-Western United States zone running from 100° E to 90° W.

25. The Western European UN Subcommittee members (UK and France), in line with the May 25, 1957 Presidential decision\* that the European zone should be left to the initiative of Western European nations, did take the initiative in advancing in the NATO Council the concept of a 5°-35° European zone. The NATO Council then left to the Western UN Subcommittee members (U. S., UK, France, Canada) the manner in which this zone should be advanced. During the 4-Western Power meetings at the end of July with the Secretary heading the U. S. Delegation, it was decided not to advance 5°-35° European zone but to advance for "discussion" and only under conditions of complete inseparability a small but undefined European zone.

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\* NSC Action No. 1722.

### Outer-Space Objects

26. Particularly in view of the recently apparent Soviet strides in satellite-missile technology, it is in the U. S. interest now to make separable from the rest of the package and to agree to the August 29th proposal for the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would assure the use of outer-space objects for peaceful purposes.

27. The Soviet during the London discussions did not react to the U. S. missile proposal except to indicate that their proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons included all "rockets".

### Armaments Regulation Organization

28. The setting up of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the UN Security Council would be in the U. S. interest. Agreement on such an organization by itself would have certain value in breaking the atmosphere of stalemate and thereby improving the chances for agreement on subjects on which the two sides are not now far apart. Such an organization also could begin to make the control studies that would be basic to agreements on any additional steps of disarmament.

29. The Soviet have repeatedly indicated their support for some kind of international control organization under the UN Security Council.

### Other August 29th Proposals

30. The remaining proposals in the August 29th paper are separable and can be practically implemented in successive steps if agreed upon.

## II. POLICY OBJECTIVES

31. Actively to seek a safeguarded disarmament agreement, beginning with a partial agreement and subsequently extending the initial step or steps into a more comprehensive agreement. In negotiation of the foregoing, the United States should seek either individually or in combination measures which would:

a. Break the present deadlock, gain experience in inspection and regulation, and at the same time be careful not to impair the security of the United States in the event that further progress in developing wider disarmament agreements was not forthcoming.

b. Reduce the danger of great surprise attack and thereby give continuing vitality to the nuclear deterrent.

c. Inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of "fourth countries".

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d. Reduce the probability of weapons systems, particularly missile systems, from developing in a way as to increase the danger of major nuclear conflict being initiated either by accident or by actions of other than the responsible national officials, particularly with regard to the growing problem of dispersion of authority to take action which would initiate world war.

e. Enhance the political position of the United States with regard to its allies and the uncommitted nations.

f. Facilitate within the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc countries the rise of "non-Stalinist" elements and ultimately the evolution of the Soviet Bloc countries into more liberal and democratic societies, including the true independence of the satellite countries.

### III. POLICY GUIDANCE

32. The United States, after consultation with the NATO states and other free countries as appropriate, should propose the following separable measures as a basis for an initial agreement:

a. (1) Immediately following ratification of the agreement, the installation of approximately eight to twelve test monitoring inspection stations with appropriate agreed scientific instruments, in the USSR, a like number in the United States, and suitable numbers of such stations in the Pacific Ocean areas, and at other necessary locations, as agreed by competent scientists and as specified in the agreement. (See attached map, Annex A.) The inspectors to have the right to make prompt on-the-spot observations at any point indicated by their instruments as being a probable site of a nuclear test explosion in violation of the agreement.

(2) Subject to the satisfactory agreement on the inspection stations and on prompt installation of the inspection system, and further subject to the right to end the test suspension before expiration of the 24-month period upon notice of a violation of the agreement upon any important particular; a 24-month suspension of nuclear testing beginning on September 1, 1958, or as soon thereafter as the agreement is effective. This agreement would take effect as soon as ratified by the United States, the USSR, the UK, and any other state, such as Australia, whose territory might require inspection. This agreement would be open to adherence of additional states.

b. Establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack in Western USSR and Central Europe. (See attached map, Annex B.) This zone would be from approximately 3° East longitude to 28° East longitude and from 45° North latitude to the Arctic Circle zone described in c.

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c. Establishment of an inspection zone in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, Northwestern United States, and Western Canada. (See attached map, Annex C.) This zone would include all of Siberia east of 108° East longitude and the additional Soviet Arctic Circle territory including the Murmansk area. The West would submit to inspection the Arctic Circle area of Norway, Greenland, Canada, and Alaska, and in addition a sufficient proportion of Northwestern United States and Western Canada so as to approximate the same number of square miles as the Soviet area and to include the same percentage of U. S. and USSR area.

(NOTE: The zones referred to in paragraphs b and c would have aerial and limited ground inspection of the type proposed in the Four-Power proposal of August 29, 1957.)

d. The establishment of a technical committee to study the inspection requirements of a system to assure that outer-space objects would be used and maintained only for peaceful purposes. This committee would limit its study to the technical problems.

e. The establishment of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the Security Council of the United Nations to supervise any of the foregoing measures that are agreed, as well as to prepare for the supervision of future additional agreed measures.

f. An undertaking by all signatory states to make an early and sustained effort, during the initial 24 months of the test suspension, to reach agreement upon, and begin to implement additional steps of, disarmament and arms control, including all of the other measures contained in the August 29, 1957, Western proposals.